

# Uniforms, Power and Ideology: The Main Features of Egyptian Regimes (1952-2011)

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*No one should have expected  
that the army would abandon their institutional interests<sup>1</sup>.*

Mass uprisings in Egypt in January 2011 led to the fall of the long-term regime of Hosni Mubarak. This fired many analysts, researchers and scientists to examine in more detail the characteristics of that regime, as well as its predecessors, in order to determine the causal factors of its fall. In this sense, as well as due to the need to provide a comparative analysis of the main features between the regime of Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak (1981-2011) and the regime of his predecessors Gamal Abdel-Nasser (1956-1970) and Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat (1970-1981) there is given a description of the actions of these leaders in the social, economic, and political spheres with a special emphasis on the relationship with the military as a constant with greater or lesser intensity of influence since the fall of the monarchy in 1952 until today.

Moreover, in order to better understand nature and characteristics of the mentioned Egyptian regimes, there is presented a description of the political, cultural and historical identity of Egypt, i.e. the Hellenistic, Roman, Ottoman, French and English cultural, historical and political traces, and the influence of the Christian and Islamic Sunni religions on the socio-cultural shaping of the former land of the pharaohs.

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<sup>1</sup> Brown, 2013: 56.

## Political, Cultural and Historical Identity of Egypt

Ancient Egypt located on the banks of the Nile River in North Africa was one of the first and most influential civilizations whose development took more than 3,000 years – longer than any other civilization in world history. In the Neolithic period, several tribes were formed in the area of Upper and Lower Egypt. In 3150 BC, Pharaoh Menes united both Egypts, which were conquered by the Assyrians from Mesopotamia in 671 BC, and in 525 BC fell under the rule of the Persians<sup>2</sup>. In 332 BC, Alexander the Great conquered Egypt and founded Alexandria, that became the seat of Greek culture and trade. The Ptolemies later adopted Egyptian customs and lifestyle<sup>3</sup>. The Romans conquered Egypt in 31 BC. Since the Roman Empire split into two parts in the 4th century BC, Egypt was part of the Byzantine Empire until the 7th century. Then it fell under the rule of the Arabs who brought Sunni Islam. Also, Christianity appeared in Egypt in the year 33 and by the 4th century had a considerable influence.

The Mamluks (*Turkish-Circassian military caste*) conquered Egypt in 1250<sup>4</sup>. Their rule was prosperous and established civil institutions, but ended with the conquest of the Turks and annexation to the Ottoman Empire in 1517. Napoleon I invaded and established power over Egypt in 1798<sup>5</sup>. However, French rule did not last long, the Ottomans regained control over the land on the banks of the Nile in 1801<sup>6</sup>. The modern political system of Egypt is mainly based on the legacy of the rule of the Ottoman Empire, that is, Pasha Muhammad Ali and his successors from 1805 to 1882, then the forty-year political and military control of Great Britain from 1882 to 1922, and the so-called the liberal period from 1922 to 1952, when it was actually still under British control.

The Ottoman Empire regained control over Egypt after the departure of the French at the beginning of the 19th century, with the young Albanian commander *Muhammad Ali Passover al – Mas’ud Ibn Agha*

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<sup>2</sup> Lunn, 2000: 425.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*: 426.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

as governor. Ali developed a modern administration and a semi-professional army trained by European officers, as well as launched the mechanical and maritime industries, and the production of cotton, sugar beet, etc<sup>7</sup>. Governor introduced modern education in schools, and sent young people to European countries, especially France, for training<sup>8</sup>. Muhammad was also a great military leader, so during his reign he occupied Sudan and Syria. However, he achieved all the results in order to improve the interests and position of the Turkish elite, not the people he ruled.

After Ali's death in 1849, his immediate successors *Abbas I* (1849-1854) and Said (1854-1863) were not significant figures except that they started the construction of the Suez Canal. In 1863, Ismail came to power<sup>9</sup> and in 1866 allowed the establishment of a representative assembly with an advisory role. It was a step towards political opening based on example of Western societies. In addition, during his reign in 1869, the Suez Canal was opened<sup>10</sup>. Ismail's efforts to make Egypt a great power led to bankruptcy and financial dependence on Great Britain and France, and then to their political interference<sup>11</sup>. In 1879, they removed him from power and replaced him with his son Teufik.

Teufik was not skilled in the proper management of the country, the large number of Europeans and Turks in the administration and government caused anger and dissatisfaction among the Egyptians, especially the landowners and the rich. The landowner Urabi initiated a nationalist uprising, accusing the authorities for repression and discrimination. Although Urabi himself later got a seat in the government, the nationalist charge grew. This caused concern among Europeans and the intervention of Britain in 1882, which established control over Egypt, although it officially remained part of the Ottoman Empire<sup>12</sup>.

Great Britain established a Consulate General which aimed to rule Egypt in the English interest. During the British administration, absolute liberalism was introduced which meant the abolition of all state interven-

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<sup>7</sup> Osman, 2011: 24-25.

<sup>8</sup> Kampanini, 2011: 43-45.

<sup>9</sup> Lunn, 2000: 426.

<sup>10</sup> Osman, 2011: 27.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*: 32.

<sup>12</sup> Cook, 2012.

tionism and taxes on large property. Rice and grain production increased, but cotton production continued to dominate. Administration, financial and tax policies were improved so that Egypt became solvent and the parliament continued to function. However, there were no changes in social domain, no investment was made in the education of the Egyptians, and the British consuls perceived them as an immature people.

The nationalist movement brought together Christians, Jews and Muslims. This indicates that Egyptian nationalism was not based on a single language, religion or any similar characteristic. Nationalist aspirations grew so that the first political party was formed in 1907 under the name of the Fatherland Party (*Hizb Watani*) and its goal was liberation from colonial rule. Later, other organizations appeared with the same goal, such as Hizb Al Uma<sup>13</sup>. After the First World War, Britain turned Egypt into its protectorate. This was one of the reasons for the “revolution of 1919”, which gathered all social classes and affected all areas of the country. Egyptians of Islamic and Christian faith united under the *Wafd* party<sup>14</sup>. Three years after that, Great Britain recognized the independence of Egypt.

From 1922 to 1952, the liberal period of Egyptian history began. However, Great Britain still kept troops in Egypt and had possession over the Suez Canal. Kings Faud and then Farouk ruled absolutistically, trying to suppress the influence of the parliament. Farouk’s favor with Italy and Germany provoked a military intervention by Britain, which installed a government composed of members of the *Wafd* party. Such foreign interventionism, the weakness of the elitist *Wafd* party that did not listen to the masses, economic inefficiency, and the defeat in the war with Israel in 1948 led to the creation of the revolutionary secret society of the Free Officers.

Officers revolted by injustice and corruption staged a coup on July 23, 1952. A year after that, a republic headed by General Muhammad Nagib was proclaimed<sup>15</sup>. Nagib came into conflict with Gamal Abdel Nasser, one of the founders of the society, who did not agree with Nagib’s point of view to hand over power to civilians and return the army to the

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<sup>13</sup> Kampanini, 2011: 48-49.

<sup>14</sup> Osman, 2011.

<sup>15</sup> Kampanini, 2011: 81-84.

barracks<sup>16</sup>. The winner of that conflict was Nasser, who was elected president in 1956, ending the period of post-revolutionary transition<sup>17</sup>.

### Restrictive Quasi-Competitive Hegemonic Authoritarian Regime

The beginning of the second half of the 20th century, i.e. 1952, and the overthrow of the monarchy marked the beginning of the development of a modern political system for Egypt on its own, free from the intervention of external forces. The basic characteristics of this system until 2011 were limited political pluralism, limited political competence, fake opposition parties, electoral irregularities, hegemonic position of a certain party, limited civil rights and freedoms. In other words, a restrictive quasi-competitive hegemonic authoritarian system was established in Egypt from 1952 to 2011, where a total of three presidents changed: Nasser (1956-1970), Sadat (1970-1981) and Mubarak (1981-2011). Each of them gave their stamp to the given system with the characteristics inherent in their style of government (see diagram 2).




Diagram: Basic characteristics of the regime 1952-2011: Nasser-Sadat-Mubarak.

<sup>16</sup> Stacher, 2014: 375.

<sup>17</sup> Lunn, 2000: 427.

Republican Egypt led by General Nasser began to establish complete autonomy and sovereignty over its territory. Nasser created an authoritarian system based on pan-Arabism and socialism, i.e. a strong state, one party, and militarism since the military was represented in the bureaucracy and government. Pan-Arabism<sup>18</sup> referred to the aspiration for the political unification of all Arabs. This resulted in the union with Syria in the so-called The United Arab Republic, UAR, which disintegrated in the early 1960s<sup>19</sup>, but also due to the unsuccessful war with Israel. Nasser's socialism was not Marxism, class struggle, weakening of the role of the state, atheism, but an appeal to the religious values of Islam and the strengthening of the state via the nationalization of enterprises<sup>20</sup>. Parliament was dissolved, and all political parties were banned, except for the ruling Arab Socialist Union, ASU<sup>21</sup>.

The Arab Socialist Union represented a mass political organization, i.e. a movement with 7,000,000 members whose aim was the political activation of the masses of “peasants, workers, soldiers, intelligentsia and non-exploitative bourgeoisie”, while all socio-political and other organizations had to carry out policy of Union<sup>22</sup>. An important position within the political system had the army, whose members occupied the highest political positions, and became the most organized force, which enjoyed an undoubted advantage compared to the Arab Socialist Union<sup>23</sup>.

In 1952 and 1961, Nasser initiated reforms in the field of agriculture, and implemented partial nationalization of foreign capital, including the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. The nationali-

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<sup>18</sup> Egypt had the most prominent role in the Arabic world from three reasons: size of territories; number of population (90 million out of 400 million Arabs); and *de facto* independence within the Ottoman Empire. The main opponent of Egypt's natural leadership role in the Arab world was Saudi Arabia, which pursued a much more conservative policy based on religion (Afsah, 2016).

<sup>19</sup> Unlike the European Union, the UAR was not institutionalized, i.e. it lacked developed institutions, because of, *inter alia*, it quickly disintegrated (Gardner, 2011).

<sup>20</sup> Kampanini, 2011: 124.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*: 375.

<sup>22</sup> Jovicic, 2006: 797.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

zation of Suez caused an unsuccessful military intervention by France, England and Israel, which withdrew under pressure from the USA and the USSR<sup>24</sup>. In this way, Nasser won a political victory and gained great popularity throughout the Arab world. Egypt passed through the process of transforming a military-revolutionary regime with democratic elements into a first-type democracy with socialist elements.

Nasser died in 1970 of a heart attack, and was replaced by Mohammed Anwar Al-Sadat, who was a high-ranking officer and vice president of Egypt twice during Nasser's tenure. Sadat is known for economic liberalization, making peace with Israel in 1979<sup>25</sup> and improving cooperation with the USA<sup>26</sup>. In order to prevent a possible military coup, Sadat rotated officers in the highest military positions, sometimes more than once a year. He dissolved the ASU and in 1978 formed a new party, the Nationalist Democratic Party, NDP.

The law from 1970 allowed the establishment of political parties, but they could not have a religious basis, which excluded the Muslim Brotherhood, nor be similar in orientation to the ruling NDP, which excluded liberal parties<sup>27</sup>. The Committee for the Affairs of Political Parties was established, which decided on the establishment of parties, as well as the banning of existing ones, and the majority of its members were members of the NDP<sup>28</sup>. In 1971, Sadat promulgated a new Constitution.

The economic reforms he introduced resulted in corruption, increased unemployment and inequality, while the influence of Islamist organizations grew due to their aid to the poor. He was assassinated on October 6, 1981, by a group of activists associated with jihad<sup>29</sup>.

He was replaced by his vice-president in 1975, Hosni Mubarak<sup>30</sup>, who introduced a state of emergency that was in effect until 2011. Although basic civil and political rights were guaranteed by the Consti-

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<sup>24</sup> Gardner, 2011.

<sup>25</sup> The agreement with Israel led to the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League until 1989.

<sup>26</sup> Stacher, 2014: 376.

<sup>27</sup> Miller *et al.*, 2012: 91-92.

<sup>28</sup> Cook, 2007: 69-71.

<sup>29</sup> Orbach, 2012: 962.

<sup>30</sup> Stacher, 2014: 377.



tutions of 1956 and 1971, the state of emergency enabled the regime to do the opposite. This was reflected in media censorship, arrests of journalists, bloggers, restrictions on freedom of political organization and assembly<sup>31</sup>. The judiciary was under the control of the president. The security forces were brutal in their actions, and corruption was more and more widespread. Such a situation caused protests, in December 2004, with a request for the resignation of Mubarak. The Protestants gathered under the leadership of the “Enough” movement (*Kifaya*) and were made up of secularists and Islamists. However, they were quickly suppressed<sup>32</sup>.

The first multi-party presidential elections were organized in 2005<sup>33</sup>, where a number of unfair conditions were set. Only a party that has existed for five years and has 3% of the seats in both houses could nominate a candidate, who had to have at least 250 signatures from regime officials, and most of the officials were representatives of the NDP<sup>34</sup>. Similarly, the parliamentary elections held in the same year were characterized by irregularities and repression. Municipal elections that were supposed to be held in 2006 were postponed to 2008<sup>35</sup>. Meanwhile, political dissidents, especially members of the strongest opposition force, the Muslim Brotherhood, were targeted for persecution.

The number of registered non-governmental organizations has increased. However, in 2002, a law was passed according to which all non-governmental organizations must be apolitical, their international financing was prevented, and the government was given the authority to prohibit their activities<sup>36</sup>.

Mubarak continued with the reforms started by Sadat, which consisted in the privatization of state property, encouraging foreign investments, etc. This led to the creation of crony capitalism, i.e. a special business elite loyal to the regime. The gap between the rich

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<sup>31</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2012: 6-11.

<sup>32</sup> Badran, 2012: 36.

<sup>33</sup> King, 2009: 8.

<sup>34</sup> IRI, 2005: 6-7.

<sup>35</sup> Freedom House, 2009.

<sup>36</sup> Law No. 84.



and the poor has been widening so that the percentage of the poor rose from 16.7% in 2000 to 25.2% in 2011<sup>37</sup>. The unemployment rate of young people aged 15 to 24 in 2010 was 26.3%<sup>38</sup>. This led to the growth of their dissatisfaction and activism, largely thanks to access to the Internet. The invitation to demonstrations in 2011 was sent through a Facebook group by activists of the April 6th movement, which was joined by the Enough movement<sup>39</sup>.

### Civil - Military Relations 1952-2011

Unlike neighboring countries, Egypt is an old country that was not created by colonial powers, but was created by its own forces, largely thanks to the army. The waging of the war against Israel in 1948, followed by the coup d'état in 1952, which overthrew the monarchy, and the removal of 80,000 British troops from the Suez Canal indicated the important position of the army in creating the Egyptian state, preserving its territorial integrity and sovereignty<sup>40</sup>.

During the reign of Pasha Muhammad Ali within the framework of the Ottoman Empire and later the British colonial administration, there was created a professional army separated from the civil-political authority<sup>41</sup>. However, since 1952, the army has been involved in political decision-making processes, with the degree of involvement varying depending on the nature of the president's rule and his (in) dependence on the army.

The military's involvement in politics led to a decrease of its professionalism and efficiency. This was one of the reasons for the defeat by Israel in 1967<sup>42</sup>. After the defeat, the army is transformed, i.e. the political and military decision-making processes are separated and a clear command system is established<sup>43</sup>. The new president Sadat fo-

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<sup>37</sup> UNDP, 2011.

<sup>38</sup> World Bank, 2010.

<sup>39</sup> Miller *et al.*, 2012: 95.

<sup>40</sup> Gaub, 2014: 23, cited according to Blagojević, 2016b: 760.

<sup>41</sup> Blagojević, 2016b: 760.

<sup>42</sup> Gaub, 2014: 23, cited in Blagojević, 2016b: 761.

<sup>43</sup> Blagojević, 2016b: 761.

cused the army on military mission and tasks, which led to its transformation from an institution that led the revolution to an institution that was subordinated to civilian control<sup>44</sup>. In 1964, former members of the army held 22 out of 26 regional governorship positions, and in 1967, less than five<sup>45</sup>.

However, the control was not complete since the military had autonomy in terms of the budget, the spending of military aid, the recruitment of new members, etc. Moreover, it occupied an important position on the market via military organizations and companies under the supervision of the Ministry of Military Production. The military industry was involved in the field of weapons production, agriculture, tourism, electricity production, and even the production of olive oil and bottled drinking water<sup>46</sup>. In this way, the army enjoyed economic privileges such as free health care, duty-free imports, etc. The Egyptians called its involvement in politics “military economy”, since it became a significant financial and industrial power<sup>47</sup>.

In accordance with the Constitution from 1971<sup>48</sup>, the President of the Republic appoints military officers, and foresees the formation of military courts by law and the definition of their competences in accordance with constitutional principles<sup>49</sup>. Also, the Constitution stipulates that no organization or group can establish a military or semi-military formation<sup>50</sup>.

During Mubarak’s rule, the educational level of officers increased significantly, the percentage of officers with a university degree rose from 1% in 1967 to 70% in 1994. Members of the army received their

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<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> Gaub, 2014: 24, quoted according to Blagojević, 2016b: 761.

<sup>46</sup> Blagojević, 2016b: 761.

<sup>47</sup> Droz-Vincet, 2014: 189, cited according to Blagojević, 2016b: 761.


<sup>48</sup> After the Officers’ Revolution in 1952, a new Constitution was adopted in January 1956, and due to the formation of the union with Syria, a new Constitution was adopted in 1958, and after its dissolution, a transitional Constitution was adopted in March 1964, which was valid until the proclamation of the Constitution of Egypt in September 1971 (IDEA, 2016).

<sup>49</sup> Article 143, paragraph 1 and Article 183.

<sup>50</sup> Article 180, paragraph 3.

education at military schools, including the first Military Academy in the Arab world founded in 1811 in Cairo<sup>51</sup>. Also, first Soviet and then American military aid contributed to the modernization of the institution. As a result of the peace with Israel, the USA was, annually, giving to Egypt 1.3 billion dollars, in form of military aid<sup>52</sup>.

The Egyptian army was part of joint training with the American, Jordanian, Russian, Greek, Israeli forces, as well as the forces of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. In addition, Egyptian units were specially sent to Russia in order to attend training with Russian military forces<sup>53</sup>.



According to SIPRI data, allocations for the military were above 2% of GDP during Mubarak's rule, while in the post-Mubarak era, they are in constant decline, while 2018/19 recorded the lowest allocations of 1.2%.

<sup>51</sup> Military School Directory.

<sup>52</sup> Martini & Taylor, 2011: 67-70.

<sup>53</sup> Henkin, 2018.

Mubarak weakened the position of the military compared to his predecessors for three reasons<sup>54</sup>. First, it increased the powers and financial resources of the security services under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which were in charge of monitoring the conduct of elections, preventing and suppressing protests and other opposition activities. Second, he didn't allow to the former military officers to occupy the position of prime minister, which was held by General Kamal Hassan Ali during Sadat's rule<sup>55</sup>. Thirdly, Mubarak's intention to designate his son Gamal, who had never served in the army, as his successor caused the military dissatisfaction<sup>56</sup>. The members of military feared that Gamal would reduce its political influence and economic activities in favor of the business elite to which he belonged<sup>57</sup>.

Egypt's Military Spendings (2001-2019)		
Year	Costs in million \$	% of GDP
2001	2.834	3.1%
2002	2.903	3.4%
2003	2.384	3.3%
2004	2.370	3.0%
2005	2.659	2.9%
2006	2.953	2.7%
2007	3.307	2.5%
2008	3.780	2.3%
2009	4.017	2.1%
2010	4.407	2.1%
2011	4.464	1.9%
2012	4.558	1.8%
2013	4.360	1.6%
2014	5.085	1.7%
2015	5.476	1.7%
2016	4,513	1.7 %
2017	2.766	1.4 %
2018	3.120	1.2 %
2019	3.744	1.2 %

Source: SIPRI, 2019.

<sup>54</sup> Blagojević & Šćekić, 2017: 545.

<sup>55</sup> Frisch, 2013: 183, cited according to *Blagojević & Šćekić*, 2017: 545.

<sup>56</sup> Cook, 2007; Barany, 2011 cited according to *Blagojević & Šćekić, ibid.*; Albercht & Bishara, 2011; Frisch, 2013, Blagojević, 2016b: 761.

<sup>57</sup> Nočl, 2013, Blagojević, 2016b: 761.

## The Moment of Change

On January 25, 2011, members of various social strata, ideological and religious affiliations expressed their dissatisfaction with Hosni Mubarak's rule. Police forces tried to quell the protests, but without success, which led to the deployment of the military. However, when Mubarak ordered the military to use force to break up the protests, Defense Minister Mohammed Hussein Tantawi replied that the military would not shoot at the demonstrators.

At first, members of the armed forces did not support the protesters, but made a calculation in relation to their needs, interests and existing privileges, especially in the context of economic and financial power and influence. Assessing the strength of the popular movement and the weakness of the regime, the army decided to intervene in favor of the protests, whereby, on February 10, 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces took power.

Unlike Nasser, who based his rule on popularity and the psychological symbiosis between him and the people (who asked him to return to power even after the defeat in the war with Israel in 1967), Sadat and Mubarak were uncharismatic leaders where, in the absence of stable social and political institutions, the military represented a significant source of stability<sup>58</sup>. The development of crony capitalism, i.e. privileged business elites who based profits on a corrupt system, lack of social justice and inefficient administration caused discontent among the people. The number of inhabitants was constantly growing, which could not keep up with economic growth<sup>59</sup>. Also, the number of years of education of the Egyptian population increased and thus the expectation that they would get a job in accordance with their educational profile. However, the autocratic government could not provide this, so the youth unemployment rate increased.

The military was also dissatisfied with crony capitalism, because it had strong civilian economic competitors within that system, including Mubarak's son Gamal. Gamal was educated abroad and then, upon returning to the country, joined the NDP, while never having

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<sup>58</sup> Blagojević & Šćekić, 2017: 545.

<sup>59</sup> Amin *et al.*, 2012.

contact with the army. Gamal's eventual succession to the presidential position would probably lead to the strengthening of the economic position of the business elite to which he belonged<sup>60</sup>. This did not suit the army, which decided to support the protest against Mubarak for the sake of preserving economic interests.

The military enjoyed greater legitimacy in the eyes of the people compared to the security units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which performed the "dirty jobs" of the regime<sup>61</sup>. The military was not a foreign body but arised from its society. Therefore, by refusing Mubarak's order to fire on the protesters, the army refused to fire on the people from which it originated. In addition, its members were not ethnically or blood-related to Mubarak<sup>62</sup>. The ethnic structure of the military was homogeneous, it is predominantly made up of Muslim Arabs since they represent 90% of the population<sup>63</sup>. The act of repression against the protesters would threaten the position and status of the army as the protector and defender of the Egyptian nation, taking into account its historical position as the founder of the modern Egyptian state.

The following period was marked by intolerance, i.e. cohabitation or balance of weakness<sup>64</sup> between the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohammed Mohammed Morsi Issa al-Ayyat and the army that did not want to return to the barracks. That period ended on July 3, 2013, when the military ousted Morsi from power. After that, General Abdel Fatah Al Sisi was elected as the president of Egypt, who rules with his military junta to this day.

## Conclusions

By describing and explaining the data and information related to the rule of three Egyptian presidents, we came to the conclusion that the

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<sup>60</sup> Frisch, 2013: 186-188.

<sup>61</sup> Barany, 2011, Blagojević, 2016b: 761.

<sup>62</sup> Blagojević, 2016b: 762.

<sup>63</sup> Zgurić, 2016: 55.

<sup>64</sup> Kandil, 2012: 242.

political system in Egypt since the fall of the monarchy has always had democratic but also authoritarian elements, as well as the presence of (in)dependence on great powers. Nasser freed himself from English and French influence through the nationalization of the Suez Canal, but he sided with the Soviets, while Sadat, via the conclusion of peace with Israel, turned to America and its financial aid.

The multi-confessional and multicultural nature of Egyptian society has always determined its democratic essence, as shown by an overview of the construction of the overall political, cultural and historical identity of Egypt. On the other hand, the dominant and powerful position of the military in the political system, i.e. at political positions and its economic activity since the founding of the republic and the movement of free officers determined the authoritarian nature of Egypt's regime. Therefore, even today in Egypt we have a military junta headed by General Al Sisi.

Understanding the basic features of the rule of three Egyptian presidents until 2011 and the so-called the Arab Spring represents a necessary basis for intellection the currents of development as well as stagnation within the Egyptian social, economic and political system today. The importance of the presentation and description of the Egyptian political system 1952-2011 is reflected in the need for a more detailed cognizance of this Middle East country from a general point of view, as well as a professional point of view, especially in terms of preparation of foreign policy plans and strategies.

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